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Introduction
In November 2002, the United States 
proposed that members of the World Trade 
Organization  (WTO)  eliminate  their  tar-
iffs  on  nonagricultural  products.1  World 
exports  of  nonagricultural  goods,  which 
were  $5.4  trillion  in  2001  (WTO  2002), 
would substantially expand if the US pro-
posal were adopted. In percentage terms, 
some of the largest gains would come in 
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trade  between  developing  countries—
South-South trade—simply because high 
tariffs severely restrict it. The United States 
offered the following initial proposal:
1.  Tariffs  currently  less  than  5  per-
cent  on  nonagricultural  products 
should  be  eliminated  by  2010,  as 
should tariffs (regardless of the level) 
on  nonagricultural  products  that  are 
“highly traded.”
2.  Tariffs  in  excess  of  5  percent  on 
other goods should be reduced to less 
than  8  percent  using  a  “tariff  equal-
izer” formula, which cuts higher tariffs 
at faster rates.
3.  Between  2010  and  2015,  all  re-
maining  tariffs  should  be  reduced  in 
equal annual increments until they are 
eliminated.
The  United  States  also  suggested 
eliminating nontariff barriers on nonagri-
cultural products. The earlier (July 2002) 
US proposal on agriculture, if adopted, will 
drastically scale down agricultural tariffs 
and  subsidies  and  reverse  much  of  the 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 
of 2002 (i.e., the US Farm Act of 2002).
The  United  States  has  also  proposed 
liberalizing trade in services. However, the 
recent (March 2003) US proposal on ser-
vices does not contemplate genuinely new 
liberalization. It merely offers to “lock in” 
unilateral liberalization of services trade—
which the United States has undertaken 
since the Uruguay Round—provided that 
other  countries  are  willing  to  liberalize 
their  imports  of  services.  The  essence  of 
the  US  position  on  services  is  that  the 
1 See USTR (2002) for a summary of the proposal. 
Bilateral trade among countries that have agreed to 
a free trade agreement (e.g. the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, European Union, Mercosur) would 
not be affected by this proposal because their trade 
with each other already faces, or will face, low or no 
tariff barriers by the time the US proposal would be 
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United States is already more open than almost all 
other countries; therefore, other countries should 
liberalize before the United States makes additional 
concessions. While this posture may seem logical 
domestically, it is not helpful for completing a global 
trade deal. In particular, the US position does not 
respond to the demand of developing countries for 
increased  access  by  their  professional  workers  to 
temporary jobs in the United States and other in-
dustrial nations.2
While the US proposal for cutting nonagricultur-
al tariffs was an immediate hit with the Manufactur-
ers Alliance and the National Foreign Trade Council 
(two  US  business  lobbies),  it  predictably  ran  into 
a major sticking point.3 Developing countries that 
have  high  tariffs  would  have  difficulty  convincing 
their producers to go along, particularly since the 
tariff equalizer formula would reduce higher tariffs 
at faster rates.4 Indeed, many developing countries 
assert that the agreement reached in Doha in No-
vember  2001  implies  that  developing  countries 
should be given more flexibility than rich countries 
to implement trade liberalization agreements. “Flex-
ibility” is WTO-speak for lesser obligations to reduce 
trade barriers. Developing countries correctly point 
out that the US tariff equalizer formula would com-
pel many of them to undertake greater obligations: 
faster  and  thus  more  painful  trade  liberalization 
than would be required of rich countries (which al-
ready have low average tariffs). Like eating spinach 
and exercising, trade liberalization is certainly good 
for  the  user,  but  it’s  not  necessarily  pleasurable. 
Thus, from a political economy perspective, develop-
ing countries did not instantly welcome the US pro-
posal. Furthermore, even Japan and the European 
Union  objected  out  of  fear  that  the  US  proposal 
would harm politically sensitive sectors.5
A  few  political  leaders  in  highly  protectionist 
countries have successfully used trade negotiations 
to  surmount  entrenched  domestic  interests.  For 
example, President Miguel de la Madrid overcame 
intense  opposition  to  Mexico’s  accession  to  GATT 
and President Carlos Salinas did the same in the 
North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA) 
negotiations.  President  Jiang  Zemin  surmounted 
entrenched  domestic  industrial  interests  to  se-
cure China’s accession to the WTO. By extracting 
“concessions” from developed countries, these far-
sighted political leaders were able to convince their 
constituents  that  the  pain  of  trade  liberalization 
was worth undertaking.
The majority of the developing countries have 
not  subscribed  to  the  same  vision.  In  multilat-
eral GATT rounds, developing countries have typi-
cally resisted substantial trade liberalization, even 
though  their  barriers  are  high.  And  developed 
countries have accepted this fact of life to achieve a 
multilateral consensus. The Doha Round has been 
showcased as a development round. Unfortunately 
for themselves and the world trading system, most 
developing  countries  interpret  this  label  to  mean 
that—as  in  prior  GATT  rounds—they  are  under 
little obligation to reduce their own tariff barriers. 
At least that is their negotiating position as of mid-
2003. One hopes this position will change as the 
negotiations proceed.
Meanwhile, the US position has evolved in light 
of the predictable opposition from developing coun-
tries and skepticism from the European Union and 
Japan. In early May 2003, US Trade Representative 
Robert Zoellick and EU Trade Commissioner Pascal 
Lamy floated a plan (without specifics) that would 
allow more flexibility for developing countries.6 De-
veloping  countries  would  be  permitted  to  reduce 
their tariffs at a slower rate and, at the end of the 
process, retain higher average barriers.  In addition, 
WTO  members  would  eliminate  their  “nuisance 
tariffs” (those below a threshold of 2 percent [EU 
proposal] or 5 percent [US proposal]) and acceler-
ate their tariff reductions on sectors of “particular 
2 See “Demands for worker access emerge as new hurdle in ser-
vices talks,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 16, 2003. Access for tempo-
rary workers is called “Mode 4” services trade, in the language 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
3 See Preeg (2003) for a report of reactions from various quar-
ters. Interestingly, the National Association of Manufacturers 
urges a selective sector-by-sector approach; not surprisingly, 
the American Textile Manufacturers Institute vigorously op-
poses the US proposal as “an outright gift to China.”
4 Preeg (2003) gives this report: “India’s ambassador to the WTO 
called the proposal clearly unfair and a Malaysian representa-
tive said that Malaysia would jealously defend its right to main-
tain customs duties in order to protect its infant industries. 
Other initial critics include Brazil, South Korea, the Philippines, 
and Pakistan.”
5 According to Preeg (2003), “an EU official characterized the 
U.S. proposal as  ‘unrealistic’, while a Japanese trade diplomat 
similarly doubted that it is  ‘practical or realistic’.”
6 See “Zoellick, Lamy float common concept for industrial tariff 
cuts at OECD,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 2, 2003.
In percentage terms, some of the largest 
gains [from eliminating tariffs] would come 
in trade between developing countries—
South-South trade—simply because high 
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interest”  to  developing  nations,  such  as  textiles, 
clothing,  and  footwear.  The  last  two  suggestions 
would sweeten the tariff offer of developed nations 
as viewed by most developing countries.
In  mid-May  2003,  the  chairman  of  the  WTO 
Negotiating Group on Market Access, Pierre-Louis 
Girard,  floated  his  own  proposal  for  a  tariff-cut-
ting formula.7 The chairman’s proposal fits within 
the mercantilist traditions of GATT and the WTO: 
roughly reciprocal cuts by all members. His formula 
starts with bound tariff rates (which, for developing 
countries, generally exceed applied rates by a sub-
stantial margin). Countries with high bound rates 
at the beginning of the Doha Round would still have 
high bound rates at the end of the implementation 
process. Needless to say, the United States did not 
acclaim the chairman’s proposal.
In light of the mercantilist atmosphere that has 
historically guided tariff negotiations in the GATT 
and  WTO,  this  policy  brief  outlines  the  political 
arithmetic of the original US proposal from the per-
spective of 23 economically important countries.  It 
concludes that the original US proposal, as put for-
ward, is unlikely to gather adequate support in the 
WTO, as long as members adhere to the mercantilist 
tradition. This is true, even though most opponents 
of the US proposal stand to gain the most from sub-
stantial trade liberalization. As early reactions have 
indicated, if the US vision of a tariff-free world is to 
become a reality, the United States and other rich 
countries must be willing to eliminate their tariffs 
rather quickly, put additional concessions on the 
table in agriculture and services, and allow some 
developing countries to phase out their tariffs at a 
far slower pace.
If the Doha Round bogs down and fails to liber-
alize trade, some countries may be tempted to adopt 
protectionist “solutions” when problems arise. For 
example, in the United States, the agricultural sec-
tor became more protected through enlarged subsi-
dies during 1995–2002, when the absence of “fast 
track” trade promotion authority effectively blocked 
multilateral  trade  negotiations.  This  experience 
illustrates  the  “bicycle  theory”  of  trade  liberaliza-
tion—when the bicycle was not moving forward, it 
fell over. If other rich countries take similar steps 
backward in the wake of a failed Doha Round, the 
adverse implications could be significant, especially 
for developing nations. 
Payoff from Trade Liberalization
Almost all economists argue that trade barriers 
diminish a country’s income. Conversely, trade lib-
eralization makes a country richer. If governments 
and their citizens took this advice to heart, trade 
barriers  would  have  been  completely  eliminated 
long ago. For reasons of political arithmetic—which 
are discussed later—most countries cling to their 
protective armor. This section puts some numbers 
forward to illustrate how much countries might gain 
if they would shed that armor and embrace the US 
tariff proposal.
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002) simulated 
the effect of a 33 percent reduction in trade barri-
ers (including both tariff and nontariff barriers) in 
manufactured  trade  using  a  computable  general 
equilibrium model. They found that global income 
would  increase  by  $163  billion  annually.  The  US 
proposal contemplates a 100 percent reduction in 
tariffs on manufactured goods and other nonagri-
cultural products. The United States also proposes 
slashing nontariff barriers. In rough terms, the pay-
off from the US proposal might be three times as 
large as the Brown, Deardorff, and Stern estimates, 
which translates into a global income gain of about 
half a trillion dollars annually, when the barriers 
are completely phased out. 
Table 1 shows how these gains might be distrib-
uted for a sample of countries based on a tripling 
of the Brown, Deardorff, and Stern estimates. Their 
model indicates that all countries and regions gain 
from  trade  liberalization  and  that  trade  balances 
stay about the same. In terms of economic payoff, 
the US proposal should sell itself, particularly be-
cause developing countries, which have the highest 
tariffs, gain the most from trade liberalization. While 
developed countries should expect annual income 
gains  of  less  than  2  percent  of  GDP,  developing 
countries in Asia might expect annual income gains 
exceeding 4 percent of GDP.
Developing countries correctly point out 
that the US tariff equalizer formula would 
compel many of them to undertake greater 
obligations: faster and thus more painful 
trade liberalization than would be required 
of rich countries.
7 See WTO (2003a). The chairman’s proposal was tabled with a 
view toward reaching agreement on modalities by May 31, 2003, 
the deadline agreed in the Doha declaration (but not met). Prior 
to the chairman’s proposal, the WTO secretariat published a 
note evaluating various formula approaches to tariff negotia-
tions. See WTO (2003b).Number PB03-8 June 2003 4
Nevertheless, as already noted, many develop-
ing  countries  have  expressed  strong  reservations 
to the US proposal, and the chairman of the nego-
tiating group has proposed his own less ambitious 
formula. The next sections explain how the political 
economy calculations, which drive the negotiating 
position of countries, differ substantially from the 
economic payoff calculations.
Methodology for Political Economy Calculations
The data are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Integrated  Trade  Solution  Database  (2003),  using 
the most recent year for which data are available, 
usually 2001 or 2002. This database contains bi-
lateral trade data and tariff data for manufactured 
products  at  the  4-digit  level  of  the  International 
Standard  Industrial  Classification  (ISIC),  revision 
two.8 The tariff data are applied (not bound) rates 
that take into consideration existing preferential ar-
rangements.
We  define  “perceived  pain”  as  the  theoretical 
tariff revenue forgone due to the elimination of the 
tariff.9 For each of the 23 economically important 
countries, we calculate perceived pain using a for-
mula that considers a country’s imports M from an 
exporter e of product p and the trade-weighted W 
and simple S tariff rates in that country’s c tariff 
schedule:
Perceived pain = theoretical tariff revenue forgone 
= ∑ Mep *0.5 (Wcp / 100 + Scp / 100)
     e,p
In theory, this measure should roughly equate to 
the  tariff  revenue  forgone  when  an  importer  re-
Table 1.  Payoff from free trade in manufactured goods
Export increase Import increase GDP increase GDP increase
Country/region (billions of dollars) (billions of dollars) (billions of dollars) (percent)
Philippines 14 12 15 16.4
Malaysia 14 13 9 7.7
Korea 25 24 26 4.5
China 58 48 33 3.6
Thailand 12 10 5 2.6
Indonesia 7 7 6 2.5
Turkey 5 4 5 2.5
India 12 10 9 2.2
Japan 47 57 136 2.1
Australia/New Zealand 10 11 8 1.6
EU/EFTA 69 70 118 1.1
Mexico 3 3 4 1.1
Canada 6 6 8 1.0
United States 55 61 71 0.8
Source: Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002). Their estimates of gains due to a 33 percent reduction in manufactured trade 
barriers are tripled in this table to more closely reflect the US proposal.
9 A good economic argument can be made that the formula Δt / 
(1+t) better correlates with the increase in market access from a 
tariff cut than the formula Δt (where Δt is the percentage point 
change in the tariff and t is the base tariff in percent ad va-
lorem). For example, if Δt is 10 percentage points and the base 
tariff is 20 percent ad valorem, the increase in market access 
from eliminating the tariff is greater than if Δt is 10 percentage 
points and the base tariff is 50 percent ad valorem. However, as 
a practical matter, importers and exporters look more closely at 
Δt values than Δt / (1+t) values. Assuming that the tariff cut is 
passed along to domestic purchasers in a lower landed price, 
in the first instance a 10 percentage point tariff cut will reduce 
the landed price by 8.3 percent (0.10/1.20); in the second 
instance, a 10 percentage point tariff cut will reduce the landed 
price only by 6.7 percent (0.10/1.50). Hence the Δt / (1+t) for-
mula better reflects the additional market access made possible 
by a tariff cut.
8 Among industrial countries, applied and WTO-bound rates 
are generally similar. Among developing countries, bound rates 
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moves  its  tariffs.  In  practice,  the  actual  amount 
of tariff revenue may be different (probably much 
lower)  due  to  special  arrangements  and  outright 
corruption. We average the trade-weighted and the 
simple tariff rates to reflect both the differing im-
portance of tariff lines (measured by actual imports) 
and the discouraging effect on imports of very high 
tariff. However, for most countries, the weighted av-
erage tariff level and the simple average tariff level 
are very similar.10
As  economists  know  and  preach—and  as  the 
results  from  Brown,  Deardorff,  and  Stern  dem-
onstrate—for a country as a whole, the economic 
gains to household and industrial consumers from 
greater imports outweigh the loss of tariff revenue 
and transitional costs of reallocating resources to 
more productive sectors. But economists, or even 
industrial  consumers,  seldom  drive  the  political 
arithmetic of trade negotiation. Instead, directly af-
fected producers—import-competing firms and ex-
porting firms—usually drive the process. Our mea-
sure of “perceived pain”—tariff revenue forgone—is 
a  measure  of  the  anticipated  economic  hardship 
faced  by  import-competing  firms  in  the  event  of 
liberalization. In rough terms, the “perceived pain” 
reflects market access awarded to foreign suppliers 
as a consequence of eliminating tariffs.11
Analogously, for a country’s exporting firms, we 
define “perceived gain” as the tariff revenue forgone 
by  importing  m  countries  for  their  purchases  of 
manufactured products p that the subject country 
exports X, based on the importing countries’ trade-
weighted W and simple S tariff rates:
Perceived gain = theoretical tariff revenue forgone 
= ∑ Xmp *0.5 (Wmp / 100 + Smp / 100)
     m,p 
We are not claiming that the tariff revenue is trans-
ferred from the destination country to the exporting 
country. Rather, our measure of perceived gain is 
a proxy for the anticipated scope of increased mar-
ket opportunities for exporting firms when partner 
countries eliminate tariffs. Politicians usually size 
up a trade agreement by asking: “How much did we 
cut and how much did you cut?” Our measures of 
pain and gain are intended to capture this crude po-
litical arithmetic, regardless of its economic merit.
Using  our  figures  for  perceived  pain  and  per-
ceived gain, it is possible to calculate average tariff 
cuts on each country’s imports and exports. The tar-
iff cut on a country’s imports is equal to perceived 
pain divided by that country’s total manufactured 
imports. Analogously, the tariff cut on a country’s 
exports is equal to perceived gain divided by that 
country’s total manufactured exports.
For  each  of  the  23  countries,  our  “political 
arithmetic index” is equal to the difference between 
that  country’s  perceived  gain  and  perceived  pain 
divided by the sum of that country’s perceived gain 
and perceived pain. The political arithmetic index 
reflects the relative balance between perceived pain 
and  perceived  gain  from  the  perspective  of  each 
country’s producers. When multiplied by 100, the 
political arithmetic index lies between negative 100 
and positive 100.12
We  also  calculate  a  salience  index,  which  is 
equal to the sum of a country’s perceived gain and 
perceived pain divided by that country’s total trade. 
When multiplied by 10, the salience index is always 
greater than zero and in practice is less than two. 
The reason for the salience index is that, for coun-
tries such as Canada, tariff cuts negotiated in the 
WTO do not matter much, because those countries 
already get and give tariff-free access to their domi-
nant trading partners. For Canada, the dominant 
trading  partner  is  the  United  States,  and  NAFTA 
provides  tariff-free  access.  In  mercantilist  terms, 
Canada should care very little whether or not the 
US  proposal  is  accepted,  so  its  salience  index  is 
close to zero.13
A tariff elimination proposal needs to be 
carefully tailored to maximize the benefits 
to developing countries while giving them 
ample time to accept, and adjust to, the 
changes that trade liberalization will require.
10 The correlation between the two averages for the 23 countries 
in our sample is almost 1.0.
11 See Hufbauer and Elliott (1994, 33–34) for diagrams and for-
mulas to calculate (in static terms) the loss in producer surplus, 
the gain in consumer surplus, the loss of government tariff rev-
enue, and the gain in economic efficiency resulting from a tariff 
cut. Our measure of protection very roughly correlates with the 
loss of producer surplus.
12 For example, Argentina’s political arithmetic index value is 
59.7. This indicates that Argentina’s exporters are likely to be 
significantly more vocal in their support of the US proposal 
than Argentina’s importers are in their support. By comparison, 
Australia’s political arithmetic index value is –4.1, which indi-
cates that Australia’s imports are likely to be slightly more vocal 
than Australia’s exporters.
13 Argentina’s salience index is 0.8 while Australia’s is 0.5. This 
indicates that Argentina’s firms should care more about the US 
proposal than Australia’s firms.Number PB03-8 June 2003 6
Table 2.  Political economy calculations











































Argentina 1.4 9.8 14.5 0.4 1.5 23.9 59.7 1.6 94.0
Australia 3.9 32.1 12.2 4.2 53.4 7.9 -4.1 1.0 -3.9
Brazil 3.2 33.0 9.7 2.5 12.0 21.0 12.0 1.3 15.3
Canada 2.1 175.0 1.2 0.1 143.0 0.1 90.2 0.1 6.2
China 19.4 300.0 6.5 55.4 206.0 26.9 -48.1 1.5 -71.1
EU 61.0 1,670.0 3.7 47.0 1,960.0 2.4 13.0 0.3 3.9
Egypt 0.4 3.3 11.3 0.5 2.2 22.0 -13.7 1.6 -21.5
India 3.1 33.1 9.3 20.0 31.1 64.5 -73.4 3.6 -264.3
Indonesia 4.0 28.8 13.8 2.5 23.9 10.6 22.1 1.2 27.4
Japan 40.2 371.0 10.8 3.7 55.5 6.6 83.3 1.0 85.7
Korea 14.9 122.0 12.2 3.0 27.0 11.1 66.5 1.2 79.7
Malaysia 5.3 82.4 6.4 6.7 65.6 10.2 -11.9 0.8 -9.7
Mexico 1.7 123.0 1.3 17.6 174.0 10.1 -82.8 0.6 -53.7
New 
Zealand
1.2 8.6 13.9 0.6 12.0 5.0 33.6 0.9 29.3
Nigeria 0.0 0.7 4.5 1.9 5.0 39.0 -96.8 3.5 -335.5
Pakistan 1.1 7.0 16.2 0.3 1.0 29.1 59.6 1.8 105.9
Philippines 1.6 29.6 5.4 1.9 26.2 7.3 -9.3 0.6 -5.9
Russia 2.8 36.1 7.7 0.5 3.0 15.3 71.6 0.8 59.3
South Africa 1.8 17.7 10.3 2.0 17.7 11.5 -5.5 1.1 -6.0
Taiwan 11.9 81.7 14.5 7.7 89.6 8.5 21.6 1.1 24.6
Thailand 4.7 49.0 9.6 10.8 50.2 21.5 -39.1 1.6 -61.2
Turkey 3.8 23.6 16.1 3.5 32.3 10.8 4.3 1.3 5.6
United 
States
39.4 684.0 5.8 39.8 961.0 4.1 -0.5 0.5 -0.2
Note: Manufactured trade under ISIC, revision two, includes processed agriculture.Number PB03-8 June 2003 7
Our  composite  index  is  equal  to  the  political 
arithmetic index times the salience index. The com-
posite index is intended to capture a country’s likely 
opinion of the US proposal (the political arithmetic 
index) and how intensely that country should care 
about the US proposal (the salience index). Some 
countries (like Canada) could have unambiguous, 
yet weak opinions about the US proposal due to an 
extreme political arithmetic index but a negligible 
salience  index.  Many  developing  countries  have 
salience indexes that are higher than Canada’s, so 
if  those  developing  countries  have  unambiguous 
opinions on the US proposal, their composite index 
values will be extreme.
Results of the Political Economy Calculations
Table 2 presents the political economy calcula-
tions (and repeats the formulas used to make the 
calculations). For developed countries, in general, 
the political arithmetic index and the salience index 
are close to zero; thus, the composite index is low. 
Japan is an exception, but the figures are somewhat 
misleading. Japan has a large surplus in manufac-
tured trade and low tariff barriers. However, Japan 
has  high  nontariff  barriers  in  the  manufacturing 
sector,  which  are  not  taken  into  account  in  this 
analysis.
Developing countries have higher salience val-
ues and more extreme political arithmetic values. 
However, some developing countries have positive 
political arithmetic values (and thus positive com-
posite index values), and some have negative politi-
cal arithmetic values. For example, oil is Nigeria’s 
primary  export,  which  faces  few  tariff  barriers. 
Hence,  Nigeria  gains  little  from  the  US  proposal. 
However, Nigeria’s manufacturing sector is highly 
protected, so it would experience a lot of political 
pain if the US proposal were adopted. Nigeria also 
has a high salience value, so its composite value is 
very negative. On the flip side, Russia has a very 
positive composite index due to high salience and 
large gains relative to pain if it gets tariff-free access 
to the European market.
Figure 1 shows the relation between the com-
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Figure 1.  GDP increase versus composite indexNumber PB03-8 June 2003 8
of GDP) for countries where payoff data are avail-
able from table 1. Japan and Korea have positive 
composite index values that are relatively large and 
GDP gains that are large for developed countries. 
The other developed countries have small but posi-
tive composite index values and GDP gains. Howev-
er, the prospective enthusiasm of these countries is 
offset by potential negative evaluations from Mexico, 
Thailand, China, and especially India. In these four 
countries, moderate GDP gains may be overlooked 
since their composite index values are very nega-
tive. Malaysia and the Philippines both have large 
GDP gains but negligible composite indexes, which 
suggests  that  the  supporters  (exporters)  and  op-
ponents (importers) should be roughly balanced in 
these two countries.
WTO  negotiations  operate  by  consensus  and 
by the principle of a single undertaking (no aspect 
of the negotiations, such as manufactured tariffs, 
agricultural subsidies, intellectual property, etc., is 
agreed to until all aspects of the negotiations are 
agreed). Thus, if only a few countries object to the 
US proposal, they can bring the entire process to a 
halt. Many countries have already opposed the US 
proposal, and the political economy calculations in 
this policy brief explain why.14
Conclusion
In order for a tariff-free world to come into ex-
istence,  WTO  members  will  have  to  embrace  the 
proposition that imports as well as exports are good 
for national well-being. Imports bring cheaper goods 
for industrial and household consumers and force 
competing domestic firms to become more efficient. 
Political leaders need to explain that increased im-
ports are a harbinger of national prosperity, even 
when competing producers suffer. Everyone knows 
that  larger  exports  are  a  political  blessing.  The 
tough political assignment is to sing the virtues of 
imports. Affected producers usually nourish close 
connections with government leaders, and numer-
ous politicians depend heavily on those who have 
the most to lose from trade liberalization. It is easy 
to demagogue free trade when the strongest foreign 
competitors are multinational corporations.
Thus, a tariff elimination proposal needs to be 
carefully  tailored  to  maximize  the  benefits  to  de-
veloping countries while giving them ample time to 
accept, and adjust to, the changes that trade liber-
alization will require. Tariff elimination could bring 
great benefits in terms of increased trade and higher 
incomes. However, if rich countries insist that de-
veloping  countries  quickly  slash  their  tariffs,  it 
seems unlikely that tariff elimination will command 
a WTO consensus.
Trade liberalization should not stop with tariff 
barriers.  The  United  States  and  other  industrial 
countries  should  be  generous  in  their  proposals 
to reduce subsidies to their farmers and eliminate 
nontariff  barriers  on  agricultural  imports.  Also, 
the United States in particular should offer more 
on services trade, particularly in “Mode 4,” which 
allows for temporary foreign workers. Unless rich 
countries put additional concessions on the table, 
WTO agreement to eliminate tariff barriers may be 
postponed for years.
14 In an earlier draft of this policy brief, we experimented with 
different tariff-staging approaches—for example, complete elimi-
nation of industrial country tariffs much faster than develop-
ing-country tariffs. Our political economy conclusions were not 
materially affected, so long as all countries are committed to 
eliminate their tariffs.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. This publication is part of the
overall program of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily
reflect the views of individual members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.Number PB03-8 June 2003 9
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